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COMMENT

THE TITLE IX CONTRACT QUAGMIRE
Bryce Freeman*
Courts and scholars have long grappled with whether and to what extent educational institutions are in contract with their students . If they are, then
students can sue their private universities for breaching that contract—
ordinarily understood as the student handbook and other materials—when
the institution levies a disciplinary action against the student . But what
promises, both implicit and explicit, do private universities make to their students that courts should enforce? This question has resurfaced in the Title IX
context, where courts have largely drawn clear dividing lines between the
rights of public and private university students . This Comment provides a
framework to understand courts’ approaches to contract law and higher education as well as implications for Title IX .
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INTRODUCTION
Few legal questions are as important, sensitive, and controversial as what
procedures colleges and universities should use to adjudicate complaints of
campus sexual assault. Studies have found that nearly one out of four female
undergraduate students experience sexual assault. 1 Most incidents go unreported. 2 The reasons for not reporting include a sense that the conduct was
not serious enough to report, feelings of embarrassment, and concern that
nothing will be done about the misconduct. 3 When survivors do report, Title
IX interpretive guidance requires universities to investigate the complaint
and respond through conducting “grievance procedures.” 4 Since the Department of Education’s 2011 “Dear Colleague” Letter, 5 critics have charged
that the procedures at these “quasi-judicial” hearings are biased against the
accused. 6 Soon after taking office, the Trump Administration rescinded the
“Dear Colleague” Letter and initiated a rulemaking process 7 that has also
been heavily criticized. 8 Almost ten years after the “Dear Colleague Letter,”

1. DAVID CANTOR ET AL., WESTAT, REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY
SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 83 tbl.3-22 (2015), https://www.aau.edu
/sites/default/files/%40%20Files/Climate%20Survey/AAU_Campus_Climate_Survey_12_14_1
5.pdf [https://perma.cc/TWR9-JS42]. Reporting rates range from 5 percent to 28 percent depending on the type of behavior. Id . at xxi.
2 . Id . at iv.
3 . Id .
4 . See infra Section I.A.
5. Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter on Sexual Violence (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter],
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T8HQ-Y97K].
6. Lara Bazelon, The Landmark Sexual Assault Case You’ve Probably Never Heard of,
POLITICO MAG. (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/sexualassault-title-ix-trump-california-san-diego-215037 [https://perma.cc/E8ST-AJT8]; see also infra Section I.A.
7. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified
at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) (allowing an institution to use a preponderance standard only if it also
uses that standard for violations of its code of conduct that carry the same potential maximum
sanction); Candice Jackson, Acting Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
Dear Colleague Letter on Campus Sexual Misconduct (Sept. 22, 2017), https://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/8PDV-HTFW].
8 . See Tovia Smith, Trump Administration Gets an Earful on New Campus Sexual Assault Rules, NPR (Jan. 30, 2019, 7:32 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/30/689879689
ON
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the public continues to struggle to answer the critical question of what procedures universities are obligated to afford to survivors and those accused of
sexual misconduct.
Beneath the surface of this difficult question lies another: Are private
university students in contract with their universities, and if so, what are the
terms of the contractual relationship? When universities discipline students
accused of sexual misconduct, those students often seek judicial review. 9 All
students may sue under Title IX statutory remedies, which require a finding
of gender bias, 10 and public university students may sue under the Due Process Clause. 11 Private university students, though, generally cannot sue under due process and instead pursue breach of contract claims. 12 These
students allege that they are in contract with their private educational institutions and then point to the terms of their student handbooks, as well as
notions of “fundamental fairness,” as the source of a private university’s contractual obligations in Title IX investigations and hearings. 13 The question of
what private universities owe their students is not new, 14 but the blend of
public and private law that is private universities’ contractual liability in the
Title IX context is yet unexplored.
This Comment proposes a framework for understanding the contractual
liability of private universities and uses the recent surge of Title IX litigation
as the basis for this inquiry. Though not comprehensive, the framework is a
heuristic for appreciating the range of judicial approaches. It avoids the difficult questions of what procedures and standards should be employed, leaving that problem to other commentators, practitioners, and affected
students. Instead, this Comment analyzes how courts have—or have not—
stretched the boundaries of contract law in a way that provides private university students with equal access to judicial review of their institution’s sexual misconduct disciplinary actions. While some courts applying contract
law have adhered closely to the fundamental contract law principles one
might learn in a first-year contracts course, 15 others have openly departed
from these principles to facilitate equitable opportunity for judicial review
between public and private university students. 16 Still others land somewhere
in the middle, using contract law to create a door to judicial review for students, but leaving the key with the institution itself. 17

/education-department-gathers-feedback-on-new-campus-sexual-assault-rules [https://perma
.cc/6QKV-YUCT].
9 . See infra Section I.B.
10 . See infra Section I.B.2.
11 . See infra Section I.B.1.
12 . See infra Section I.B.3.
13 . See infra Section I.B.3.
14 . See infra Section I.B.3.
15 . See infra Section II.B.2 (analyzing the Virginia Model).
16 . See infra Section II.B.1 (analyzing the Massachusetts Model).
17 . See infra Sections II.B.3–4 (analyzing the New York and Pennsylvania Models).
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Part I explores the legal landscape governing Title IX grievance procedures, the causes of action plaintiffs employ against their universities, and
the existing literature on the contractual liability of private universities. Part
II analyzes four approaches to contractual liability courts have taken in the
Title IX context. The Comment concludes by highlighting the approach taken by courts applying Pennsylvania law, which strikes the best balance between providing private universities with equitable access to judicial review
while still adhering to ordinary principles of contract law.
I.

TITLE IX GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES AND RELATED LAWSUITS

The U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has
worked to reduce the incidence of sexual misconduct on college campuses by
encouraging institutions to respond with disciplinary action. 18 Ensuring that
reported instances of misconduct are taken seriously while also providing
some protections for the accused is a difficult task—one that OCR has grappled with for decades. 19 Survivors deserve a system that responds to their
complaints without causing undue stress, 20 and the accused are entitled to
some minimum safeguards for their constitutionally protected interests in
completing their education. 21
The debate over how to balance these interests often sounds in due process. While plaintiffs’ arguments will be referred to as “due process” claims
for convenience, in reality there are several causes of action available to such
plaintiffs, including statutory causes of action and breach of contract. Yet
these claims are not available to all plaintiffs and vary considerably in terms
of what plaintiffs must plead to survive motions to dismiss. This Part first
situates the recent flurry of contractual claims within the statutes, regulations, and guidance documents shaping disciplinary procedures for students.
It then discusses the causes of action available to those seeking to challenge
the results of these disciplinary procedures, including due process, statutory
18 . See S. Daniel Carter, In Defense of the Title IX Dear Colleague Letter, HUFFPOST
(Sept. 16, 2017, 10:45 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/in-defense-of-the-title-ixdear-colleague-letter_us_59bddb9ae4b06b71800c3a2f [https://perma.cc/US7Q-NVD8] (arguing the Department of Education’s 2011 “Dear Colleague” Letter, discussed supra note 5, was
successful in adding protections for both survivors and the accused while also pressuring universities to take more seriously their role in combatting sexual harassment).
19 . See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
20. Multiple survivors have publicly criticized their universities for failing to adequately
respond to their complaints of campus sexual assault, often forcing survivors to either attend
classes with the accused or else leave the university themselves. See, e .g ., Audrey Chu, I
Dropped Out of College Because I Couldn’t Bear to See My Rapist on Campus, VICE (Sept. 26,
2017, 12:51 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qvjzpd/i-dropped-out-of-collegebecause-i-couldnt-bear-to-see-my-rapist-on-campus [https://perma.cc/8TGV-UFLJ].
21 . See Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 311 F. Supp. 3d 881, 892 (S.D. Ohio 2018) (finding that
the plaintiff’s interest in continuing his medical education and applying to residencies was
“substantial” for due process purposes and that the plaintiff’s expulsion threatened those interests through forcing him to enroll in an offshore medical school and making him ineligible for
federal student loans).
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causes of action, and breach of contract. This discussion reveals that Department of Education efforts to combat campus sexual assault have reignited a debate within courts about whether and to what extent private
universities are subject to contract claims from their students.
A. The Statutory and Regulatory Background of Title IX Grievance
Procedures
The complex web of campus sexual assault adjudication began in 1972
with Title IX of the Education Amendments. 22 The statute provides that
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 23 This mandate has enormous reach, encompassing any public or
private school for any age group, including institutions of higher education. 24 Under Title IX’s effectuating regulations, institutions must “adopt
and publish grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of student and employee complaints” of actions in violation of Title
IX. 25 When OCR finds an institution has discriminated on the basis of sex,
thereby violating Title IX, the institution must take “remedial action.” 26
While OCR has published guidance on how universities should take
“remedial action” regarding peer-on-peer sexual harassment since at least
the mid-1990s, 27 OCR’s 2011 guidance marked a crucial turning point in
how grievance procedures were viewed by the public and courts. In its April
2011 “Dear Colleague” Letter (DCL), OCR discussed both preventative and
remedial measures to address campus sexual misconduct that would allow
universities to demonstrate compliance with Title IX. 28 Core to this effort
was requiring schools to resolve complaints of sexual harassment in a
“prompt and equitable” manner, which may include disciplinary action
against the accused student, accommodations for the complainant, and rem22. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235.
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
24 . Id . § 1681(c). Only a handful of private educational institutions refuse to accept any
federal funds. See Ibby Caputo & Jon Marcus, The Controversial Reason Some Religious Colleges Forgo Federal Funding, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com
/education/archive/2016/07/the-controversial-reason-some-religious-colleges-forgo-federalfunding/490253 [https://perma.cc/N5MJ-KKYR].
25. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (2019).
26 . Id . § 106.3(a).
27. Office for Civil Rights; Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by
School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (Mar. 13, 1997). In
2001, OCR issued revised guidance establishing that, where a school knows or should know of
an incident of sexual harassment, “the school is responsible for taking immediate effective action to eliminate the hostile environment and prevent its recurrence.” U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF
STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 12 (2001).
28. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 5.
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edies for the broader student population. 29 While the DCL permitted a wide
amount of variance in the structure of grievance procedures from school to
school, it noted that compliance with Title IX requires “[a]dequate, reliable,
and impartial investigation of complaints, including the opportunity for
both parties to present witnesses and other evidence.” 30 Failure to comply
with the Title IX “prompt and equitable” requirement may result in the loss
of federal funds. 31
Much of the scholarly attention given to the DCL has focused on whether the protections OCR expects universities to provide to accused students
satisfy due process. Generally speaking, due process requires government actors to provide individuals notice of state actions against them and an opportunity for a fair hearing. 32 In the criminal context, the Court has held that
due process requires both proof beyond a reasonable doubt 33 and the ability
for defendants to cross-examine their accusers. 34 OCR made clear in the
DCL, however, that it expected universities to use a preponderance standard
to reach findings of “responsibility” 35 and to bar the opportunity for the accused to cross-examine complainants. 36 Because a finding of responsibility
can result in disciplinary action up to expulsion and be permanently reflected on a student’s transcript, OCR’s expectations for grievance procedures
and satisfaction of due process requirements have been subject to considerable controversy. 37
29 . Id . at 9, 16–17.
30 . Id . at 9.
31 . Id . at 16.
32. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). Important for the purposes of this
Comment, Judge Friendly deemed judicial review one element of a fair hearing in his seminal
article on the subject. See Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,
1294–95 (1975).
33 . In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). But see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
431–33 (1979) (holding a clear and convincing evidence standard is constitutionally adequate
in civil commitment cases).
34 . See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1970) (“In almost every setting where
important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”).
35 . See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 5, at 10. OCR uses the term “responsibility” to
describe situations in which the university reaches the conclusion that a student violated the
school’s sexual misconduct policy. E .g ., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Q&A
ON CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 5 (2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs
/qa-title-ix-201709.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9MW-X9GC].
36. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 5, at 12.
37 . Compare, e .g ., Nancy Chi Cantalupo, For the Title IX Civil Rights Movement: Congratulations and Cautions, 125 YALE L.J.F. 281, 291 (2016) (“Using anything more stringent
than a preponderance standard would symbolize that we as a society are comfortable with giving one group of women and girls, as well as men and boys who are gender-minorities and victimized because of it, unequal treatment when compared to everyone else.”), Sheridan
Caldwell, Note, OCR’s Bind: Administrative Rulemaking and Campus Sexual Assault Protections, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 476–86 (2017) (arguing the preponderance standard serves a
critical role in establishing procedural equality between the survivor and the alleged perpetra-
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While scholarly attention has overwhelmingly focused on the question
of grievance procedures as fair hearings, this Comment is primarily concerned with the effects of the DCL’s notice provisions. 38 The DCL included
recommendations to universities on how exactly to notify students of the
availability and characteristics of these procedures. OCR expected that
“grievance procedures be prominently posted on school Web sites; sent electronically to all members of the school community; available at various locations throughout the school or campus; and summarized in or attached to
major publications issued by the school, such as handbooks, codes of conduct, and catalogs.” 39 Further, the DCL specified that these materials should
include “what constitutes sexual harassment or violence[,] . . . what to do if a
student has been the victim of sexual harassment or violence[,] . . . [and]
what the school will do to respond to allegations of sexual harassment or violence.” 40 The DCL therefore operated not only to influence the processes and
standards used in grievance procedures but also the way institutions inform
students of their rights and responsibilities under Title IX.
In many jurisdictions, student handbooks and other materials are considered part of a legally binding contract between students and their universities. 41 Assuming for a moment that all private university student
handbooks are contracts, OCR effectively required universities to modify
tor), and Emma Ellman-Golan, Note, Saving Title IX: Designing More Equitable and Efficient
Investigation Procedures, 116 MICH. L. REV. 155, 179–86 (2017) (arguing that modest reforms,
including a higher evidentiary standard where the alleged conduct could also amount to a felony and the outsourcing of fact-finding to investigation centers, would effectively balance
OCR’s goals and rights of accused students), with Tamara Rice Lave, Ready, Fire, Aim: How
Universities Are Failing the Constitution in Sexual Assault Cases, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 637, 683–84,
692–96 (2016) (arguing that due process requires that accused students have the ability to
cross-examine their accuser and other witnesses, but conceding that the preponderance standard is likely to satisfy due process requirements), John Villasenor, A Probabilistic Framework
for Modelling False Title IX ‘Convictions’ Under the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard, 15
LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 223, 223 (2016) (demonstrating “an innocent [Title IX] defendant
faces a dramatically increased risk of conviction when tried under the preponderance of the
evidence standard as opposed to under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard”), and Letter
from Ann E. Green & Cary Nelson, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, to Russlynn Ali, Assistant
Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Aug. 18, 2011), https://www.aaup.org
/NR/rdonlyres/FCF5808A-999D-4A6F-BAF3-027886AF72CF/0/officeofcivilrightsletter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7PG-XF7T] (arguing the preponderance standard will not adequately protect those accused of sexual misconduct).
38. Other recent Notes have discussed the existence of these contractual claims without
thoroughly exploring the doctrine. See, e .g ., Emily D. Safko, Note, Are Campus Sexual Assault
Tribunals Fair?: The Need for Judicial Review and Additional Due Process Protections in Light of
New Case Law, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2289, 2313–14 n.212 (2016) (identifying the distinction
between Massachusetts and Virginia law); Matthew R. Triplett, Note, Sexual Assault on College
Campuses: Seeking the Appropriate Balance Between Due Process and Victim Protection, 62
DUKE L.J. 487, 502–05 (2012) (simply noting that courts have been “inconsistent” in their consideration of contract claims against universities).
39. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 5, at 9.
40 . Id . at 17–18.
41 . See infra Part II.
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their contracts with up to four million students 42 when it issued the DCL.
Independent of the debate over the substance of OCR’s guidance, this phenomenon led to a fresh batch of cases to understand the contractual liability
of private universities vis-à-vis their students. 43 But to fully understand the
relevance of this contract theory, one must also understand the other most
common causes of action students use against their universities: due process
and Title IX statutory claims.
B. Causes of Action Available to Challenge Grievance Procedure Outcomes
After a university disciplines a student accused of sexual misconduct following a Title IX grievance procedure, beyond an institution’s internal appeal processes, the student may turn to state or federal courts for recourse. 44
Whether a student attends a public or private institution significantly affects
what causes of action are available to them. 45 Most significantly, a student at
a public university may bring a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause. 46 But such a claim is unavailable to students at private
universities, which are outside the scope of the Due Process Clause per the
state action requirement. 47 Instead, students at private universities looking to
challenge a disciplinary action must bring alternative claims, including Title
IX statutory claims 48 and breach of contract claims. 49 Because public and
private universities face the same legal obligations under Title IX, this disparity in the availability of causes of action raises concerns over unequal access to judicial review between public and private university students.
While many courts have recognized the student–college relationship as
contractual—with the terms of the contract found in the student handbook
and other materials 50—others have explicitly rejected this cause of action. 51 It
is necessary, therefore, to consider the range of causes of action available to
private university students and the extent of judicial review under each.

42 . Undergraduate Enrollment, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (updated May 2019),
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cha.asp [https://perma.cc/R6MR-3H3B].
43 . See infra Part II.
44. Triplett, supra note 38, at 493.
45 . See id . at 497–505 (comparing constitutional due process claims at public universities with contractual due process claims at private universities and finding that “private-college
students are less protected than their public-school peers”).
46 . See infra Section I.B.1.
47 . See infra Section I.B.1.
48 . See infra Section I.B.2.
49 . See infra Section I.B.3.
50 . See infra Section II.B.
51 . See infra Section II.B.2.
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Due Process

A due process cause of action alleges that the university’s disciplinary
procedure denied the student fair notice or opportunity to be heard in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 52 Such claims have the advantage of allowing for review of a wide variety of both facial and as-applied deficiencies
in a given procedure under a clear legal framework. Courts hearing § 1983
due process challenges apply the Mathews v . Eldridge test to determine
which procedures are necessary in a particular context. 53 The Mathews test
requires courts to consider the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous
deprivation of the private interest through the procedures used, the likely
value of additional procedural safeguards, and the costs to the government
actor in facilitating these procedures. 54 Applying these factors, courts have
gone so far as to hold that the Due Process Clause requires public universities to provide the accused an opportunity for cross-examination during Title IX grievance procedures, 55 contrary to OCR’s guidance set out in the
DCL. 56
Doe v . Ohio State University typifies the application of the Mathews factors to a school’s grievance procedures. 57 There, a public university medical
student accused of sexual misconduct claimed he was deprived of due process because he was not permitted to effectively cross-examine the complainant at a hearing. 58 Applying the Mathews test, the court reasoned that
because (1) the private interest at stake (the plaintiff’s continuing medical
education and professional prospects) was substantial, (2) the denial of full
cross-examination directly contributed to the risk of erroneous deprivation,
and (3) the cost to the government was minimal, the university may have
been required to provide an opportunity to cross-examine the complainant. 59 There was no need, however, to show gender bias, in contrast with Title IX statutory claims discussed next.
52 . See, e .g ., Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 311 F. Supp. 3d 881, 889 (S.D. Ohio 2018).
53. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); e .g ., Ohio State Univ ., 311 F. Supp. 3d at 891–92.
54 . Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
55 . E .g ., Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 588 (6th Cir. 2018). But see Haidak v. Univ. Mass.Amherst, No. 18-1248, 2019 WL 3561802, at *8–9 (1st Cir. Aug. 6, 2019) (holding that due
process requires “some opportunity for real-time cross-examination, even if only through a
hearing panel,” but not that the accused himself have the opportunity to cross-examine the
complainant (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Found. for Individual Rights in Educ. in Support
of Plaintiff-Appellant at 21, Haidak, 2019 WL 3561802 (No. 18-1248))).
56 . See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 5, at 12.
57 . Ohio State Univ ., 311 F. Supp. 3d at 891–93.
58 . Id . at 882, 887–89.
59 . Id . at 892. The court noted that “cross-examination is ‘essential to due process’ . . . in
a case that turns on ‘a choice between believing an accuser and an accused.’ ” Id . (quoting Doe
v. Ohio State Univ., 219 F. Supp. 3d 645, 663 (S.D. Ohio 2016)). Missing from the court’s analysis are the potential adverse effects of cross-examination on the complainant herself. See Dear
Colleague Letter, supra note 5, at 12 (“Allowing an alleged perpetrator to question an alleged
victim directly may be traumatic or intimidating, thereby possibly escalating or perpetuating a
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While due process is the main avenue for public university students
challenging the outcome of grievance procedures, the state action doctrine
generally forecloses the same claims from private university students. 60 Indeed, the DCL itself suggests that private universities need not comply with
due process requirements. 61 Thus, while public university students who litigate their disciplinary action have a clear path under due process, students at
private universities likely have to depend on one of the following two causes
of action.
2.

Title IX Statutory Claims

For decades, lower courts have interpreted Title IX to create two distinct
categories of statutory claims for complainants and respondents challenging
the outcome of a university disciplinary proceeding. 62 The Second Circuit’s
decision in Yusuf v . Vassar College is credited with identifying these claims:
“erroneous outcome” and “selective enforcement.” 63 To plead an erroneous
outcome claim, the plaintiff must both allege sufficient facts to cast doubt on
the accuracy of the outcome of the proceeding and make a plausible showing

hostile environment.”). The Sixth Circuit ultimately held that due process does require the
right to cross-examine the complainant in a grievance procedure “if credibility is in dispute
and material to the outcome.” Baum, 903 F.3d at 584. Unlike in Ohio State University, the
court in Baum did consider the university’s interest in subjecting survivors to further harm. Id .
at 583.
60. Some private university students have sought to invoke due process protections under a Fifth Amendment theory, namely that the Department of Education had a “sufficiently
close nexus” with the private university when it issued the DCL and threatened to withhold
federal funds. This theory has not been effective in circumventing the state action doctrine. See
Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 6:14-CV-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at *8 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5,
2015) (“Plaintiff argues that W&L’s actions violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process.
Had Plaintiff been enrolled at a public university, he would have been entitled to due process
and the proceedings against him might have unfolded quite differently. Unfortunately for
Plaintiff, W&L is a private university, and as such, is generally not subject to the constitutional
protections of the Fifth Amendment.”).
61 . See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 5, at 12 (“Public and state-supported schools
must provide due process to the alleged perpetrator. However, schools should ensure that steps
taken to accord due process rights to the alleged perpetrator do not restrict or unnecessarily
delay the Title IX protections for the complainant.” (emphasis added)).
62. Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 714–15 (2d Cir. 1994). The U.S. Supreme Court
has also recognized a “deliberate indifference” claim under Title IX that applies where an educational institution reaches “an official decision . . . not to remedy” a violation of Title IX.
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). A deliberate indifference claim
is cognizable where the school had actual knowledge of the student-on-student sexual harassment and the harassment was so severe and pervasive that it deprived the victims of access to
equal educational opportunities. Davis ex rel . LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629, 638–53 (1999). While this claim is clearly useful to survivors of sexual misconduct
who argue their educational institutions failed to adequately respond to their complaints,
courts have been skeptical of its use in challenging the outcomes of a disciplinary proceeding.
E .g ., Doe v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 270 F. Supp. 3d 799, 825 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
63 . See Doe v. Cummins, 662 F. App’x 437, 451 (6th Cir. 2016).
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that gender bias motivated the erroneous finding. 64 Plaintiffs can demonstrate gender bias through Title IX statements indicating bias or patterns of
decisionmaking that suggest the influence of gender. 65 A selective enforcement claim, in contrast, asserts that notwithstanding a student’s guilt, gender
was a motivating factor in deciding to initiate the proceeding or to make the
penalty more severe. 66 While a plaintiff may plead both claims in the alternative, the allegations of gender bias must be more than merely conclusory to
survive a motion to dismiss. 67
Title IX statutory claims in this context are therefore largely concerned
with what some might call isolated incidents of “reverse gender discrimination.” 68 Courts and commentators alike have paid significant attention to the
jurisdictional split over the level of specificity required for an allegation of
gender bias to survive a motion to dismiss. 69 A majority of courts require
some specific statistical evidence or statements by university officials to meet
this burden, while a minority allow for cases to advance to discovery without
such facts. 70 Either way, because not all disputes over the fairness of a grievance procedure involve gender bias, Title IX statutory causes of action are an
incomplete substitute for due process claims for private university students.
If Title IX claims were the only means available to seek judicial review of a
private university grievance procedure determination, then a large gap in access to judicial review would exist relative to the public university context.
But in many jurisdictions, the breach of contract cause of action fills this gap.
3.

Breach of Contract

Students at private universities often rely on breach of contract to obtain
judicial review of the outcome of a grievance procedure. These students argue that the student–university relationship is contractual and point to the
student handbook and other materials as terms of the contract. 71 Recall that
the DCL encouraged educational institutions to publicize grievance proce-

64 . Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715.
65 . Id .
66 . Id .
67 . Id .
68 . E .g ., Bethany A. Corbin, Riding the Wave or Drowning?: An Analysis of Gender Bias
and Twombly/Iqbal in Title IX Accused Student Lawsuits, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2665, 2665,
2688 (2017) (analyzing pleading standards in “reverse Title IX claims”).
69 . See, e .g ., Doe v. Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177, 186–90 (D.R.I. 2016); Corbin,
supra note 68, at 2695–2702.
70. Corbin, supra note 68, at 2695–2702 (comparing and contrasting the approaches
courts have taken regarding Title IX “reverse gender discrimination” claims and noting the
minority view may be ascendant among courts).
71 . E .g ., Doe v. W. New Eng. Univ., 228 F. Supp. 3d 154, 169 (D. Mass. 2017). For simplicity, this Comment refers to the entire contract as the “student handbook,” although it may
include other materials.
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dures and definitions of sexual misconduct in their student handbooks. 72
Therefore, the breach of contract theory reasons that the DCL effectively superimposed an institution’s requirements under Title IX onto the contractual relationship with its students.
Students have sued their private colleges or universities under contractual theories for decades, and they have done so in both state and federal
court. 73 Countless university actions, such as expulsion for academic failure 74
or suspension for disruptive conduct, 75 have sparked these lawsuits. Aggrieved plaintiffs, in turn, have sought remedies that include damages 76 and
injunctions 77 against the disciplinary actions.
Commentators have long expressed both interest in and skepticism of
the idea that contract law is the appropriate vehicle for enforcing procedural
protections for private university students. One early note argued that private university students have a substantial interest in their status as students
that creates obligations for their institutions. 78 Under this view, contract is
an inadequate means to enforce these obligations. 79 Rather than inquiring
into what parties owe each other as associates, the focus is on what terms are
set out in the contract signed at matriculation and in the university’s rules
and regulations. 80 The law of private associations, then, is more appropriate
and effective as it would extend the protections of common law due process
to private university students. 81 A more recent note identified numerous
practical limitations to contract law in this context, including that it forecloses any balancing of the university’s interests and, at the same time, entrenches the university’s superior bargaining position. 82 Still others support

72 . See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 5, at 16–18.
73. Though breach of contract claims are often limited to state courts, most of the cases
discussed in Part II are decided in federal courts because students have federal statutory causes
of action available to them under Title IX. Thus, federal courts have frequently applied state
contract law in the Title IX grievance procedure context, whether because plaintiffs originally
file in federal court or because defendants remove to federal court. Diversity of citizenship may
provide an alternative route to subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e .g ., Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177
F. Supp. 3d 561, 567 (D. Mass. 2016).
74 . E .g ., Raethz v. Aurora Univ., 805 N.E.2d 696, 697 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
75 . E .g ., Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1303–05 (N.Y. 1980).
76 . E .g ., Fussell v. La. Bus. Coll. of Monroe, Inc., 519 So. 2d 384, 387–88 (La. Ct. App.
1988) (providing return of tuition and damages for delaying career as a legal secretary).
77 . E .g ., Corso v. Creighton Univ., 731 F.2d 529, 532–33 (8th Cir. 1984) (enjoining expulsion of student for allegedly cheating on exams and requiring new hearing in accordance
with terms set out in student handbook prior to expulsion).
78. Note, Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the State Action
Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120, 144 (1974).
79 . Id .
80 . Id . at 143–44.
81 . Id . at 144.
82. Scott R. Sinson, Note, Judicial Intervention of Private University Expulsions: Traditional Remedies and a Solution Sounding in Tort, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 208–11, 232 (1997)
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contract law as the “doctrinal foundation” for review of private universities’
disciplinary actions but call for courts to look beyond mere compliance with
established procedures to ensure fundamentally fair procedures. 83 At least
one scholar has quantitatively studied whether contract claims have in effect
achieved equal access to judicial review for private university students. Professor Perry Zirkel found that contract theories protect private university
students from disciplinary sanctions as effectively as due process claims at
public universities. 84 But others have expressed concern, at least in the Title
IX context, that private university students have more limited access to judicial review than their public university counterparts. 85
The discussion that follows in Part II reveals two truths about contractual claims against private universities. First, courts continue to struggle with
whether private universities are actually in contract with their students. 86
Courts at times explicitly raise concerns over the DCL, complicating the contract analysis. 87 Second, the scholarly divide over the effectiveness of breach
of contract claims in equalizing access to judicial review is explained by the
yet underexplored fact that these claims receive vastly inconsistent treatment
across jurisdictions. 88
(identifying contract as the source of a private university’s duty to its students but advocating
for a negligence approach).
83. Lisa Tenerowicz, Note, Student Misconduct at Private Colleges and Universities: A
Roadmap for “Fundamental Fairness” in Disciplinary Proceedings, 42 B.C. L. REV. 653, 685–86
(2001) (arguing that a four-corners approach to student procedural protections “invites private
schools to eliminate procedures to avoid violating them” and noting that counsel have advised
private universities to avoid promises of highly specific procedural protections).
84 . See Perry A. Zirkel, Procedural and Substantive Student Challenges to Disciplinary
Sanctions at Private—as Compared with Public—Institutions of Higher Education: A Glaring
Gap?, 83 MISS. L.J. 863, 893 (2014). Professor Zirkel’s dataset includes ninety-five cases featuring judicial review of private college or university disciplinary proceedings, of which fifteen
involved sexual harassment or assault. Id . at 882–83. He concludes that “partisan characterizations of sanctioned students at private [colleges or universities] being without a right of action
or with only a ‘dull stick’ as compared with the ‘sharp sword of constitutional safeguards’ merit
reexamination under the lenses of objective systematic analysis.” Id . at 901 (footnotes omitted).
Notably, however, his analysis is limited to ninety-five cases, fifty of which were filed in New
York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. Only two cases were filed in Minnesota, and one was
filed in Virginia. Id . at 881 & n.81.
85. Triplett, supra note 38, at 490–91, 502–03.
86 . Compare, e .g ., Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 593 (D. Mass. 2016) (“It is
well-established that the student-college relationship is contractual in nature.”), with Doe v.
Marymount Univ., 297 F. Supp. 3d 573, 587–88 (E.D. Va. 2018) (“Under Virginia law, a University’s student conduct policies are not binding, enforceable contracts; rather, they are behavior guidelines that may be unilaterally revised by Marymount at any time.”).
87 . See, e .g ., Brandeis Univ ., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 572. In Brandeis, the court noted that
while OCR’s goal of reducing sexual assault is “laudable,” the question “[w]hether the elimination of basic procedural protections . . . is a fair price to achieve that goal is another question
altogether.” Id . Because the contract analysis under Massachusetts law asks whether students
were afforded “basic fairness,” a judgment of what the DCL accomplished prior to reaching the
contract analysis seems to conflate these two separate questions. See infra Section II.B.1.
88 . See supra note 38.
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THE JURISDICTIONAL SPLIT ON STUDENT HANDBOOKS AS CONTRACTS

Courts are split on whether and to what extent student handbooks are
binding contracts that place private university students on effectively equal
legal footing with public university students. Because the DCL urged universities to publish their grievance procedures in student handbooks, accused
students have argued that these procedures are part of a contract they have
with their university, deviations from which can support a claim for breach
of contract. These lawsuits have led to a flurry of decisions discussing the
contractual liability of private universities. A close examination of these
opinions sheds new light on how courts evaluate the contractual liability of
private universities. But the import of these decisions goes beyond a lawyer’s
interest in contract doctrine. The effect of the court split is that for students
at private universities, availability of judicial review of Title IX grievance
procedures depends on an accused’s jurisdiction.
This Part analyzes this court split. Section II.A identifies two considerations courts use to evaluate contractual claims against private universities—
courts are interested not just in adhering to ordinary principles of contract
law, but also in providing equitable access to judicial review for students at
private universities. Section II.B then discusses four models and considers
the implications of each.
A. Considerations for Evaluating the Contractual Liability of
Private Universities
In deciding whether plaintiffs adequately state breach of contract claims,
courts have acknowledged that recognizing the student–private university
relationship as contractual raises a risk of departing from “ordinary” contract doctrine. 89 The consequences of finding this relationship to be contractual affect both student and institution. In terms of harms toward the
student, the chief criticism is that student handbooks, the source of the contract’s terms, lack mutuality of obligation. 90 As at least one court has noted,
89 . See, e .g ., Brandeis Univ ., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 612.
90 . See Jackson v. Liberty Univ., No. 6:17-CV-00041, 2017 WL 3326972, at *5 (W.D. Va.
Aug. 3, 2017) (recognizing “that Virginia law requires an absolute mutuality of engagement
between the parties to a contract such that each party is bound and has the right to hold the
other party to the agreement” and, as a result, dismissing a plaintiff’s breach of contract claims
where the alleged contract was the university’s student handbook and sexual assault policies).
But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (asserting
that the term “mutuality” lacks “definite meaning” and that a requirement that both parties be
bound is “obviously erroneous as applied to an exchange of promise for performance”). There
is arguably disagreement as to whether mutuality of obligation, strictly speaking, is a component of contract doctrine at all. The case of the student handbook, which a university can revise
at any time, may instead be properly understood as folded into the requirement of consideration and can be characterized as an illusory promise. Illusory promises are sufficient to void a
contract for lack of consideration where the promisor retains, as is arguable in this case, too
much discretion over whether to carry out the promise. Cf . Omni Grp., Inc. v. Seattle-First
Nat’l Bank, 645 P.2d 727, 729 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (finding the promise to complete a pur-
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universities retain the freedom to modify the terms of their student handbooks at any time after students matriculate. 91 To recognize these handbooks
as contracts may lead to universities making fewer or vaguer promises within
their handbooks. 92 Another consequence might be a loss in private institutions’ autonomy. At its core, contract law is meant to facilitate “private legislation” that binds parties who mutually assent to agreed-upon terms. 93 For a
court to write terms into a private university’s written grievance procedures
may undermine the very heart of what it means to be in contract and subject
the university to contractual liability for terms to which it did not agree. 94
Relatedly, courts hesitate to interfere with university decisions on how to allocate their own resources. 95 The reasons for narrowly construing the contractual obligations private universities owe their students are thus many and
compelling.
Despite these concerns over adherence to contract doctrine, some courts
have moved ahead with putting private university students on similar legal
footing as public university students. In deciding whether plaintiffs adequately plead breach of contract claims, some courts have focused their analysis on notions of fairness and due process rather than the explicit terms of
the contractual relationship. 96 Finding that plaintiffs can state breach of contract claims against their private universities has the effect of creating a path
to judicial review where none would otherwise exist. Where one’s ability to
seek judicial review of the outcome of a grievance procedure depends on (1)
whether one attends a private or public university and (2) if attending a private university, one’s jurisdiction, there can be a yawning gap in access to judicial review despite similar allegations. This inequity occurs despite the fact
chase of a home was not illusory where the promise was subject to buyer’s satisfaction with a
feasibility report). Despite the reticence of the Restatement to recognize that “mutuality of obligation” is a required characteristic of a contract, this Comment uses this term because it is the
basis for Virginia’s rejection of these causes of action.
91 . Marymount Univ ., 297 F. Supp. 3d at 587–88.
92. If not binding contracts, then the terms of student handbooks may be characterized
as “gratuitous promises” or simply gifts. Enforcing gratuitous promises may cause parties to
make fewer such promises out of fear of contractual liability. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1283,
1304–05 (1980).
93 . See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 806–10 (1941).
94. This concern is perhaps overblown, as the vast majority of jurisdictions recognize
that promises made within employee handbooks give rise to contractual liability, but private
employers have largely retained the ability to terminate employees at will otherwise. See Brian
T. Kohn, Note, Contracts of Convenience: Preventing Employers from Unilaterally Modifying
Promises Made in Employee Handbooks, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 807–10, 810 n.66 (2003)
(collecting cases).
95 . See, e .g ., Doe v. Allee, 242 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 131–32 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019).
96 . See, e .g ., Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 601, 603 (D. Mass. 2016) (noting “Brandeis’s obligation to provide basic fairness in its proceedings is separate from and in
addition to its contractual obligation to follow the rules it set forth in the Handbook” and explicitly invoking “basic and fundamental components of due process of law” in evaluating
Brandeis’s Title IX investigation into Doe).
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that both private and public universities are subject to the requirements of
Title IX and face an equal risk of losing federal funds for noncompliance.
Courts have not gone so far as to name this gap as a reason for finding a private university liable under a contract theory, but their contortions of contract principles show an inclination to open the courthouse doors to
students.
The various approaches to student handbooks and contractual liability
should be evaluated in light of their adherence to ordinary principles of contract doctrine and the degree to which they further equity in access to judicial review. The next Section shows how courts have incorporated these
concepts in their opinions.
B. Four Models of Student Handbooks as Contracts
This Comment proposes a framework for understanding the jurisdictional split on whether and to what extent breach of contract is a viable cause
of action in the Title IX grievance procedure context. The split is best conceptualized as a spectrum, with the “Massachusetts Model” establishing a per
se rule that student handbooks are contracts that incorporate due process
jurisprudence at one end, and the “Virginia Model” at the other end, asserting that student handbooks are never contracts because they lack mutuality
of obligation. In the middle are the jurisdictions that display differing degrees of adherence to contract doctrine and equitable access to judicial review between public and private university students. This Comment
highlights two models, those of New York and Pennsylvania, that strike a
more appropriate balance between these competing interests.
1.

The Massachusetts Model

Students who challenge the results of a Title IX grievance procedure under breach of contract will find it easiest to survive a motion to dismiss in
Massachusetts courts.97 Under Massachusetts law, the relationship between a
student and a university is based on a contract, the terms of which are contained in the student handbook.98 Massachusetts has adopted a two-part inquiry for interpreting student–university contracts. First, the court asks what
a student would reasonably expect upon reading the student handbook.99
97. Courts applying the law of other states have cited Massachusetts law approvingly
without engaging in the “basic fairness” inquiry discussed infra. See, e.g., Doe v. Rollins Coll.,
352 F. Supp. 3d 1205, 1212 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (citing Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195,
215–20 (D. Mass. 2017)); Doe v. Brown Univ., 210 F. Supp. 3d 310, 331 (D.R.I. 2016) (citing
Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 735 N.E.2d 373, 381 (Mass. 2000)). Courts applying California law
conduct a similar analysis. See Allee, 242 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 130–31 (noting that “[f]or practical
purposes, common law requirements for a fair disciplinary hearing at a private university mirror the due process protections at public universities” and contrasting its approach with that of
Pennsylvania).
98. Doe v. W. New Eng. Univ., 228 F. Supp. 3d 154, 169 (D. Mass. 2017).
99. Id. at 170.
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Courts may conduct an exhaustive comparison between the procedures provided in the particular case and those promised in the handbook at the time
of the proceeding. 100 Second, the court analyzes whether the student’s hearing was conducted with “basic fairness.” 101 At this stage, the court may refer
to due process standards used in criminal cases to determine whether the
private university’s action met the basic fairness test, although it is “wellestablished” that private universities are not required to adopt such standards. 102
Doe v . Brandeis University demonstrates the power of the Massachusetts
Model in achieving equitable access to judicial review for private university
students. The contract analysis is, at first, completely familiar; the court
asked whether the university contravened its stated procedures as a student
reasonably understood them based on the handbook’s terms. 103 For instance,
the plaintiff argued that Brandeis breached the terms of its handbook by failing to provide him with access to the investigator’s report within forty-five
days of his request. 104 Given some ambiguity in when the plaintiff requested
the report, the court found it plausible that failing to provide the report
could have prevented him from making an effective appeal. 105 The contract
analysis continued, though, into the question whether Brandeis provided the
plaintiff with “basic fairness,” both procedurally and substantively. 106 The
procedural analysis explicitly invoked due process requirements. 107 Requirements included the right to have notice of charges, retain counsel, confront the accuser, cross-examine witnesses, and review evidence. 108 The court

100 . Brandeis Univ ., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 594–600 (finding that, because private universities
may reserve the right to modify their handbooks, they may, for instance, apply the procedures
set forth in a 2013–2014 handbook to adjudicate conduct that occurred in the 2011–2012 academic year).
101 . Id . at 601. At other times, the District Court of Massachusetts has viewed the basic
fairness doctrine as a separate cause of action, referring to the “common law duty of basic fairness.” See, e .g ., W . New Eng . Univ ., 228 F. Supp. 3d at 182–83 (cleaned up).
102 . Brandeis Univ ., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 602. In addition to breach of contract, students in
Massachusetts may also allege a separate, but related, cause of action for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Such a covenant “is implied in every contract” and requires parties to conform to “the overall spirit of the bargain,” rather than the “letter of the
contract.” Id . at 612. In Brandeis, the court concluded this covenant was breached but also expressed some confusion about how this cause of action relates to the “basic fairness” prong of
the breach of contract inquiry. Id . While this cause of action would seem to independently give
courts a great deal of discretion to import due process principles into the student–private university relationship, it seems fair to ask whether this cause of action adds much beyond what
“basic fairness” already provides.
103 . Id . at 594.
104 . Id . at 598–99.
105 . Id . at 599.
106 . Id . at 601.
107 . Id . at 602.
108 . Id . at 603–06.
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also inquired into the investigator’s substantive analysis. 109 The court concluded that the failure to afford these rights to the plaintiff constituted a
breach of contract claim despite the complete lack of a contract analysis. 110
The Massachusetts Model of student handbooks as contracts thus prioritizes equitable access to judicial review over adherence to ordinary contract
doctrine. The readiness of courts to view handbooks as contracts that put
private university students on equal footing with public university students
eschews the typical analysis of whether the parties have contracted with each
other. 111 Indeed, in Brandeis, the court noted that the student–university relationship in Massachusetts is “somewhat unique and not necessarily tied to
ordinary principles of contract law.” 112 As this approach effectively incorporates notions of due process into the breach of contract inquiry, it eliminates
any practical distinction between the causes of action available to the accused depending on whether they attend a public or private university. Unlike Title IX claims, which require a showing of gender bias, breach of
contract as Massachusetts courts see it likely allows for judicial consideration
of the fairness of the policies themselves where gender bias is not at issue.
The plaintiff’s argument in Ohio State University that the lack of crossexamination violated his due process rights would be dismissed under a Title
IX statutory cause of action but would likely be allowed to advance under the
Massachusetts Model. Though cross-examination of complainants may be
inappropriate in Title IX grievance procedures, 113 it would still be concerning for a public university student to have the opportunity to litigate this
claim while a private university student with virtually identical interests
would not. The Massachusetts Model avoids this inconsistency.
2.

The Virginia Model

In contrast to Massachusetts courts, Virginia courts bar all causes of action related to contract law in the Title IX context. 114 Put simply, under Vir-

109 . Id . at 608–11 (finding “possible substantive shortcomings” that plausibly alleged a
violation of the contractual relationship).
110 . Id . at 607–08.
111. Massachusetts has such well-developed case law on this front that plaintiffs appear
to not plead due process claims at all, perhaps making the strength of this assertion difficult to
demonstrate. See, e .g ., First Amended Verified Complaint & Jury Demand at 52–68, Doe v. W.
New Eng. Univ., 228 F. Supp. 3d 154 (D. Mass. 2017) (No. 3:15-cv-30192) (including thirteen
causes of action, none of which were a violation of due process). For an example of a case in
which a due process claim was brought and dismissed and a breach of contract survived the
motion to dismiss stage, see Mancini v . Rollins Coll ., No. 6:16-cv-2232-Orl-37KRS, 2017 WL
3088102, at *8 (M.D. Fla. July 20, 2017).
112 . Brandeis Univ ., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 612.
113 . See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why crossexamination may or may not be required in grievance procedures).
114. Courts applying Minnesota law adopt largely the same contract analysis as Virginia
law, but on at least one occasion a court found the accused plaintiff adequately pleaded a negligence claim in the Title IX context. See Doe v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 240 F. Supp. 3d 984, 993–
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ginia law, “a [u]niversity’s student conduct policies are not binding, enforceable contracts; rather, they are behavior guidelines that may be unilaterally
revised by [the university] at any time.” 115 This distinction stems from the
requirement under Virginia law of “absolute mutuality of engagement” between parties to a contract. 116
The court’s treatment of the student’s claims in Marymount University is
illustrative. There, the accused student alleged Title IX gender discrimination, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the law of associations, and negligence. 117 Only the Title IX
claim survived Marymount’s motion to dismiss. 118 In raising the breach of
contract claim, the plaintiff conceded that Marymount’s Student Handbook
and Sexual Assault Policy were not contracts under Virginia law and instead
argued there was an implied contractual relationship where the payment of
tuition guaranteed he could not be expelled for an arbitrary and capricious
reason. 119 The court declined to find that an implied contract existed in a
context where Virginia state courts had not done so before and stated that,
assuming such an implied contract did exist, its terms would be “exception-

95 (D. Minn. 2017). Thus, while the contract analysis looks nearly identical, courts applying
Minnesota law provide an additional path for judicial review of private university disciplinary
actions, but one that is beyond the scope of this Comment. Courts applying Ohio law also set
an extremely high bar for students pleading breach of contract against private universities and
ask only if the relevant body abused its discretion. See Doe v. Univ. of Dayton, No. 3:17-cv-134,
2018 WL 1393894, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2018) (“In Ohio, [abuse of discretion] means
without fair, solid and substantial cause and without reason given; without any reasonable
cause; in an arbitrary manner, fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure; without adequate determining principle; not founded in the nature of things; nonrational; not done or acting according to reason or judgment depending on the will alone; absolutely in power; capriciously;
tyrannical; despotic.” (citing Gerken v. State Auto Ins. Co. of Ohio, 20 N.E.3d 1031, 1045
(Ohio Ct. App. 2014))), aff’d, 766 F. App’x 275 (6th Cir. 2019). Illinois law also provides for a
similar result, although plaintiffs in at least three cases brought claims under promissory estoppel rather than breach of contract. See DiPerna v. Chi. Sch. of Prof’l Psychology, 893 F.3d
1001, 1006–07 (7th Cir. 2018) (applying arbitrary or capricious standard to breach of contract
suits by students against private universities); Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 299 F. Supp. 3d 939,
960–62 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (finding statements made in student handbook were not unambiguous
promises sufficient to plead a promissory estoppel claim); Doe v. Univ. of Chi., No. 16 C
08298, 2017 WL 4163960, at *10–11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2017) (same).
115. Doe v. Marymount Univ., 297 F. Supp. 3d 573, 587–88 (E.D. Va. 2018) (footnote
omitted); see also Jackson v. Liberty Univ., No. 6:17-CV-00041, 2017 WL 3326972, at *5–7
(W.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2017); Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 6:14-CV-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at
*11 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015).
116 . Jackson, 2017 WL 3326972, at *5 (quoting Brown v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., No. 3:07cv00030, 2008 WL 1943956, at *5 (W.D. Va. May 2, 2008), aff’d 361 F. App’x 531
(4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). Courts have dismissed claims brought under breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing for the same reason. See id . at *7 (“Without an underlying contract, there can be no breach of contract or covenant of good faith and fair dealing
claims.”); see also Marymount Univ ., 297 F. Supp. 3d at 589 & n.23.
117 . Marymount Univ ., 297 F. Supp. 3d at 576.
118 . Id . at 591.
119 . Id . at 588.
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ally narrow.” 120 While the student sought to “erect a veritable procedural fortress around him” of implied contractual terms, the court considered his argument to fly in the face of “clear precedent” finding the student–private
university relationship to be noncontractual. 121 The court’s reasoning here is
worth reproducing in full:
[A]dopting Doe’s position would prejudice Marymount because it never
assented to being bound by the procedural protections identified by Doe.
Nothing in the act of paying tuition implies that a student is entitled to any
specific procedural protections. Instead, to the extent any contract can be
implied between a student and his or her university, the student is only
protected from irrational, haphazard treatment by the university. Doe may
disagree with Marymount’s decision and he may believe he was treated unfairly, but he cannot imply a host of contractual terms to which the parties
never assented. Instead, Doe will have to rely on the statutory remedy provided by Title IX. 122

The court also dismissed the student’s negligence claim on the grounds
that Virginia courts had never acknowledged that universities owed a duty to
be fair in their disciplinary proceedings. 123 Thus, in Virginia, there is no
cause of action equivalent to a due process claim in the private university
context. The only plausible route to judicial review of a grievance procedure
is a Title IX claim, which requires a showing of impermissible gender bias. 124
The Virginia Model has both clear advantages and troubling implications for advocates of equal access to judicial review. Rejecting the breach of
contract cause of action is clean as a matter of doctrine. Courts avoid the difficult task of deciding what conduct is prohibited or what procedural protections are guaranteed, leaving that task to the university itself. And courts
avoid the potentially slippery slope of binding universities to contractual
terms to which neither students nor the university assented in a manner ordinarily associated with contract law. Yet this model plainly fails at the task
of providing equal access to judicial review of private university disciplinary
actions. Given that public and private universities are subject to indistinguishable obligations under Title IX, Virginia’s position shields private universities from alternate forms of liability and therefore exacerbates fairness
concerns. Other approaches strike a better balance between the competing
interests of doctrinal adherence and equity in access to judicial review.

120 . Id .
121 . Id . at 589.
122 . Id .
123 . Id . at 589–90.
124 . Id . at 585. Here, the court found plausible gender bias based on the adjudicator’s
demonstration of gender bias in a separate sexual assault investigation. Id . at 585–87.
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The New York Model

In New York, courts have avoided both the doctrinal audacity of Massachusetts and the timidity of Virginia in finding the private institution–
student relationship to be implicitly contractual but finding the terms of the
relationship to be narrow. 125 New York courts acknowledge that there is an
implied contractual relationship between private students and their universities, with terms of the relationship found in university publications. 126 A private university is therefore contractually bound to provide students with
promised protections. 127 But unlike under Massachusetts law, “a plaintiff
must identify a specific promise or obligation that was breached in order to
pursue a contract claim.” 128 Even if the institution explicitly promises a
“fundamentally fair” proceeding in its handbook, no additional obligations
are triggered. 129
Doe v . Syracuse University shows just how narrow this path is for students to sue their private institutions in contract. The plaintiff in that case
primarily argued that he did not receive adequate notice of the charges
against him in spite of a handbook provision providing that “[s]tudents have
the right to written notice.” 130 The court, though, did not reach an analysis of
whether the notice the plaintiff received was in fact adequate. 131 Instead, the
court took note of the fact that the adequate-notice provision of the hand125. Courts applying the contract law of other states have employed similar analyses. See,
e .g ., Z.J. v. Vanderbilt Univ., 355 F. Supp. 3d 646, 689 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (noting similarity
with New York contract law), appeal dismissed, No. 19-5061, 2019 WL 3202209 (6th Cir. Apr.
26, 2019); Doe v. Lenoir-Rhyne Univ., No. 5:18-CV-00032-DSC, 2018 WL 4101520, at *3–4
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 28, 2018) (noting North Carolina permits student contract claims against private universities but requiring the plaintiff “to point to a mutual agreement with sufficiently
definite terms or obligations”); Pacheco v. St. Mary’s Univ., No. 15-cv-1131, 2017 WL 2670758,
at *26–30 (W.D. Tex. June 20, 2017) (applying similarly narrow conception of the student–
university contractual relationship under Texas law), appeal dismissed, No. 17–50635, 2017
WL 7036540 (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2017); I.F. v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 131 So. 3d 491, 498–
99 (La. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that “a private institution has almost complete autonomy in
controlling its internal disciplinary procedures” and that it is “entitled to a very strong but rebuttable presumption that [the institution’s] internal administrative actions are taken in absolute good faith and for the mutual best interest of the school and the student body” (emphasis
omitted)). In New Jersey, the analysis is similarly limited to whether a university (in this case,
public) complied with its own rules and regulations in conducting the disciplinary proceeding.
See Doe v. Rider Univ., No. 3:16-cv-4882-BRM-DEA, 2018 WL 466225, at *13 (D.N.J. Jan. 17,
2018); see also Doe v. Univ. of Or., No. 6:17-cv-01103-AA, 2018 WL 1474531, at *17–18 (D.
Or. Mar. 26, 2018) (same under Oregon law).
126. Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir.
2011).
127. Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
128. Doe v. Syracuse Univ., 341 F. Supp. 3d 125, 140 (N.D.N.Y. 2018).
129 . See id . at 140–41.
130. Complaint at 32, Syracuse Univ ., 341 F. Supp. 3d 125 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 5:17CV-0787). Specifically, the plaintiff alleged the only notice he received was that a student filed
a “complaint of relationship violence” against him. Id .
131 . See Syracuse Univ ., 341 F. Supp. 3d at 140–41.
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book was incorporated into the “fundamental fairness” section of the handbook. 132 Because provisions that students are treated in a “fundamentally
fair” manner are nonactionable policy statements under New York law, the
court dismissed the breach of contract claim. 133 On other occasions, though,
courts applying this more typical contract analysis have found that plaintiffs
have adequately pleaded contract claims where the statements in the handbook were not perceived as mere statements of policy. 134
Unlike Massachusetts courts, New York courts appear to end their analysis on the basis of the terms in the handbook itself; there was no inquiry into fundamental fairness in Syracuse University. New York courts have thus
adhered to ordinary contract doctrine more closely than Massachusetts
courts. This approach lets New York courts avoid expanding contractual liability while also allowing for an alternative cause of action for students at
private universities. Breach of contract in New York, though, does little to
equalize access to judicial review across types of educational institutions. Because the terms of the contract are construed narrowly, a private university
could write its student handbook to evade the types of legal challenges that
would be more successful when aimed at a public university. In contrast to
New York, the final model to be discussed—the Pennsylvania Model—allows
for greater access to judicial review while also providing institutions some
freedom to limit their contractual liability.
4.

The Pennsylvania Model

Courts applying Pennsylvania law assume that student handbooks are
express contracts and seek to apply more classical contract interpretation
while also providing for greater equity in access to judicial review for private
university students. Under Pennsylvania law, a contract exists between a private educational institution and its students, allowing students to sue under
breach of contract where the university violates its stated procedural promises. 135 Like in many other jurisdictions, the written contract includes the
terms set out in the student handbook. 136 While students “being disciplined
are entitled only to those procedural safeguards which the school specifically
provides,” 137 the terms of the handbook, if it includes a promise of fundamental fairness, may lead a Pennsylvania court to draw from notions of procedural due process required in public university disciplinary proceedings. 138
132 . Id . at 141.
133 . Id .
134 . See, e .g ., Doe v. Quinnipiac Univ., No. 3:17-cv-364, 2019 WL 3003830, at *18–21 (D.
Conn. July 10, 2019) (denying motion for summary judgment of breach of contract claim applying Connecticut law).
135. Doe v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 270 F. Supp. 3d 799, 810 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
136 . Id .
137 . Id . (emphasis added) (quoting Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573
A.2d 575, 579 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)).
138 . See id . at 812 n.6.
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Pennsylvania’s treatment of these breach of contract claims may initially appear to mirror the Massachusetts Model, but upon closer analysis the terms
within the student handbook play a much more significant role. 139
Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania provides the most thorough
explanation of how Pennsylvania’s interpretation of student handbooks may
lead to greater equivalence in how courts review the outcomes of grievance
procedures at public and private universities. There, the plaintiff cited language from the student handbook “that pledge[d] (1) . . . ‘a process that is
fundamentally fair, and free of bias or prejudice,’ (2) that the investigating
officer will conduct a ‘thorough and fair investigation,’ and (3) that the hearing will be ‘fair[] and impartial.’ ” 140 The court declined to view these terms
“in isolation” and instead compared the guarantees set out in the handbook
to the procedures essential to “fundamental fairness” as interpreted by courts
applying Pennsylvania law. 141 While the right to “fundamental fairness”
guaranteed to students at state universities is not ordinarily available to students at private universities, the court found that the inclusion of the term in
the contract altered this assumption. 142 This analysis indicated that a fundamentally fair process entitles students to know the specific charges and
grounds that would justify discipline, the names of adverse witnesses, and
the facts to which each witness testifies. 143 Students were also able to assert
their own defense. 144 In this case, the court found that the student did not
adequately allege a breach of a contractual duty to provide a fundamentally
fair process, because the procedures promised and used plainly satisfied
Pennsylvania’s basic requirements of “fundamental fairness,” and as a result,
the court did not need to resort to due process jurisprudence as a gapfiller. 145

139. Unlike Massachusetts, Pennsylvania does not require private universities to provide
students with “basic fairness” in their disciplinary proceedings. Id . at 811 n.4.
140 . Id . at 811 (second alteration in original).
141 . Id . at 812.
142 . Id . at 812 n.6.
143 . Id . at 812 (quoting Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575,
578–79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)).
144 . Id . (quoting Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 578–79
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)).
145 . See id . at 813. The court was satisfied that the university’s disciplinary procedures
promised a charge letter, provision of a draft factual investigative report for review and comment before the final version was written, a hearing in which both complainant and respondent were permitted to testify alongside other forms of evidence, and an opportunity to appeal.
Id . Because the court found these procedures satisfied Pennsylvania’s “basic requirements of
‘fundamental fairness,’ ” the court dismissed the breach of contract claim on this basis. Id . The
court did find, however, that the plaintiff adequately alleged that the university breached its
contractual duty to adequately investigate the complaint. Id . at 817–18. As discussed above,
courts applying the “New York Model” have declined to conduct this analysis even when the
student handbook similarly promised “fundamental fairness.” See Doe v. Syracuse Univ., 341
F. Supp. 3d 125, 141 (N.D.N.Y. 2018); see also supra Section II.B.3.
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Pennsylvania courts therefore closely approximate the Massachusetts
Model provided that the handbook in question promises a “fundamentally
fair” disciplinary proceeding. 146 In that event, there is effective equity in access to judicial review between public and private university students. If this
language is absent, however, then barring any other ambiguities the private
university student is protected only by the explicit promises of the student
handbook, leaving the university with greater control over defining the student’s rights. 147 Under this model, private actors decide when they are to be
held to the same standard as public actors.
CONCLUSION
The cases described in Part II demonstrate the variance in access to
breach of contract as a means for judicial review and provide the basis for a
framework to understand the contractual liability of private universities.
States fall on a spectrum, with the Virginia Model at one end and the Massachusetts Model at the other. The Virginia Model prioritizes adherence to ordinary principles of contract doctrine and forces students seeking relief to
rely on statutory causes of action. In contrast, Massachusetts courts recognize a contractual relationship between students and their private universities that effectively incorporates notions of due process—a legal regime that
largely equalizes access to judicial review between public and private university students while concededly departing from contract doctrine. 148 In between these extremes are other jurisdictions that acknowledge breach of
contract as a cause of action available to disciplined students. While courts
applying the New York Model begin and end their analysis with the terms in
the contract, Pennsylvania courts may invoke notions of due process normally applicable only to public university students where language in the
contract is sufficiently broad. Private university students in different jurisdictions either enjoy access to judicial review that is analogous to their public
university counterparts or suffer much higher barriers to the courthouse.

146 . See supra text accompanying notes 101, 107–110. For another example of a court
applying Pennsylvania law finding universities contracted into providing “fundamental fairness,” see Doe v . Univ . of the Scis ., No. 19-358, 2019 WL 632022, at *8 & n.11 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14,
2019). Courts have not conducted this comparison between the procedures provided for in the
handbook and the procedures inherent in “fundamental fairness,” however, when the complaint does not allege that the university promised a fundamentally fair hearing. See, e .g ., Powell v. Saint Joseph’s Univ., No. 17-4438, 2018 WL 994478, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2018);
Complaint at 16, Powell, 2018 WL 994478 (No. 17-4438).
147 . See Powell, 2018 WL 994478, at *5 (denying a private university student’s claim that
the university failed to hire a qualified investigator because the investigator met the explicit
requirements of the handbook).
148. This is not to say that in every application a contract claim will necessarily result in
the same disposition as would a due process claim. A Massachusetts- or Pennsylvania-style
approach, however, provides access to judicial review in a way that does not exist under the
Virginia approach.

March 2020]

The Title IX Contract Quagmire

933

Which approach is best? The two competing interests at play here—
adherence to ordinary contract doctrine and equity in access to judicial review—present no simple answer. Yet the Pennsylvania Model offers the best
balance. Under this model, courts hold institutions accountable for their
promises and protect students’ interest in their education while still granting
institutions the freedom to adopt procedures other than those required for
public institutions.
The preceding discussion reveals significant grounds for disagreement
with this evaluation. Some may argue that the Pennsylvania approach goes
too far in heaping procedural requirements on private universities for making mere policy statements and that to hold institutions liable based on these
statements may mean they simply will not be offered as frequently. 149 But if
handbooks are in fact the source of contractual terms, then unenforceable
policy statements should be removed from them anyway, because they misinform students of their rights under the contract. 150 Others may argue,
though, that the Pennsylvania Model doesn’t go far enough. Universities can
evade protecting students’ interest in their education by avoiding promises
of fundamental fairness and then offering few specific protections in the student handbook. This objection, which would advance the Massachusetts
Model, effectively deems private universities as public actors and necessarily
devolves into a debate over the merits of the state action doctrine.
Channeling Virginia courts, a final objection to the Pennsylvania Model
may call into question the entire enterprise of recognizing the student–
private university relationship as contractual. This objection at first blush
falls somewhat flat, as courts have developed a century of caselaw around
this contractual relationship, implicitly recognizing a need to protect students’ interest in their education. 151 But the ongoing divergence over the extent of a private university’s contractual obligations to its students does raise
the question whether contract is the best doctrinal home for the protection
of this interest. Perhaps the ultimate solution is to sever the fairness inquiry
from the contract analysis entirely. Courts applying Massachusetts law have
done this on at least one occasion, conceiving of the “basic fairness” inquiry
not as a second prong of the contract analysis but as an entirely separate

149 . See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing why enforcing gift promises
may lead to fewer such promises).
150. A parallel problem exists, as discussed in supra note 94, in the employee handbook
context. The Restatement of Employment Law considers policy statements in employee handbooks to be binding on the employer despite the fact that employees are unlikely to be aware of
the content of these statements. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
Instead, policy statements are considered binding on employers under a theory of “administrative agency estoppel,” namely that policy statements governing personnel policy decisions
should be binding until revoked. See Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and Policy Statements: From Gratuities to Contracts and Back Again, 21 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 307, 309
(2017).
151 . See supra Section I.B.3.
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cause of action. 152 Until more courts adopt that approach, whether in or outside the Title IX context, the question of the contractual liability of private
universities will continue to confound judges, educational institutions,
commentators, and students.

152 .

See supra note 101 and accompanying text.

